In cold war times, the 'West' espoused liberal democracy and freedom from surveillance and control. It is thus ironic that with the cold war a distant memory -though it only ended less than twenty years ago -the EU and its member states are set on a path which will, in just a few years time, turn it into the most surveilled, monitored region in the world. The wider context for all this is increased state racism (both at the national and EU levels), combined with the emergence of the 'policing state', engendered by a political and governmental authoritarianism that legitimises itself through the trappings of representative democracy.
move towards an authoritarian system of governance little different in essentials from a one-party political system. What has driven this process is capitalist globalisation, what has enabled it are the huge advances in information technology that have both furthered that globalisation and made ever-more sophisticated mass surveillance possible. European democracy is suffering from a self-inflicted wasting disease.
The symptoms
As with all diagnosis, however, it is necessary to begin with examining the most obvious symptoms, of which the first is the ongoing creation of a 'surveillance society'. In everyday life, in the streets, shopping centres, as well as on public transport, mushrooming CCTV cameras have become part of the urban landscape, in the UK particularly, as the price of 'keeping our streets safe'. But cameras on the streets are only one part of the story. There is a whole range of background personal information being amassed, collated, exchanged, added to and kept, relating to all EU populations. This passes, on the whole, with little remark, for, in everyday life, the majority are prepared to trade 'privacy for convenience' -allowing widespread access to their personal data in order to gain speedy access to a facility, for travel or to buy goods and services.
Yet look at the range of data that is being kept, or planned to be kept. Take passports; although the EU agreed back in December 2005 that everyone wanting a new passport -and probably national ID cards too -will be compulsorily fingerprinted, including children of six years old and above, few were aware of this decision. 1 There is some concern over fingerprinting but it does not, as yet, connect to people's everyday experiences. Only when 10 per cent plus, every year, of the EU's 450 million people are required to have their fingerprints taken in special 'enrolment centres' will it become apparent that 'everyone is a suspect' now. It is only a matter of time before DNA is taken too. 2 Similarly with driving licences, for which the EU regime is also changing. In the UK, you used to get a driving licence for life (or up to 70 years old when a medical check is needed). This is to be replaced by ten-year licences (five renewals up to 70 years of age) and eventually five-year ones (ten renewals up to 70), which will allow the data and interoperability of the chip to be regularly updated. 3 And, finally, the EU 'Health Card' (now just a piece of plastic) is set to carry a 'chip' with a full medical record on it. Meanwhile, the UK is currently introducing a national health (NHS) database containing the whole population's medical records. 4 So, in three basic areas, common to the majority of the population -passports, driving licences and health records -detailed personal information is not only to be kept, but expanded, updated and, technically, made accessible to whichever state bodies and officials are ultimately deemed to require it -or to theft, loss, criminal exploitation, and so on. That such databases have the capacity to 'speak' to each other (data-mining) and share or exchange information only adds to the completeness of the surveillance tools that are available to the state. We will, then, have chipped biometric documents for a passport, ID card, driving licence and medical records. How long will it be before we have one state document carrying all this data? And how long before the same document/'chip' gives us access to so-called 'e-government' services, like borrowing a library book, going to a doctor, claiming benefit, and so on? To this scenario must be added the measures already in place in the EU for the surveillance of telecommunications and of travel. For there will not only be a mass of data stored on each individual, from a bewildering variety of entry points, there is also the potential to monitor that individual as he or she goes about their daily activities. In 2005 the EU adopted a directive on mandatory data retention, requiring all service providers to retain communications data for phone calls, faxes, emails, mobile phone calls (including the location) and internet usage. This is now being implemented across the EU. And in the autumn of 2007 the European Commission put forward a proposal for an EU-PNR (Passenger Name Record) scheme to track all travel in and out of the EU. 5 Thus, a subject could, potentially, be monitored almost in 'real time'. And the profile that can be constructed of a targeted person's life with all this data (plus that pulled in from commercial sources) may well be highly intrusive and open to abuse -giving western states a capability the old Soviet Union would have been proud of.
If asked whether they wanted in live in George Orwell's '1984', few would say 'yes', but most would make no connection with the sweeping changes happening before their eyes or planned for the immediate future. This is partly because such changes are hidden in plain sight, as it were, under this directive or that directive, this draft order or that. People do not know or understand the make-up of the 'big picture' and, anyway, they think they will be all right -after all, this only affects 'illegal immigrants', criminals and terrorists, not them. Those who do understand, through their everyday experiences, are those directly affected, migrants, migrant communities (especially Muslim ones), the unemployed, the poor and the marginalised. But they have no voice and no power.
The diagnosis
What, though, has driven this process? In what do its origins lie? While 11 September 2001 and the 'war on terrorism' are usually seen as driving the creation of a surveillance society, with its international parameters and cross-border reach, this view dehistoricises that moment. Of course, it is true that many of the substantive developments have taken off since then, particularly relating to international travel, but, in essence, the creation of the surveillance society long preceded 11 September. What 11 September did was to remove the democratic constraints on the use and development of widespread mass surveillance technologies.
The creation of the surveillance society is best understood as an aspect of globalisation. Though it has hitherto been little examined as such, it has to be seen through this prism. Globalisation was already well under way by the 1980s, although often not recognised at the time. 6 By the late 1990s, its effects were becoming obvious for all to see. 'Globalism', the ideological underpinning of globalisation, preached (and imposed) free markets, neoliberal privatisation of state industries and institutions, unfettered free movement of goods and capital, disciplining and control of labour (no unfettered freedom there), with its disposal at the behest of foreign multinationals. In the 1990s, we can say that globalisation became a hegemonic economic system. The unconstrained freedom of global neoliberalism necessitated retention and creation of powers for the close disciplining of possibly recalcitrant populations, either overtly, through state force as in many Third World countries, or covertly through techniques of surveillance, as in many western democracies. For, while globalisation is popularly understood as an interconnected, interdependent world, characterised by lightning communications, easy travel and international trade, this is by no means the whole picture. At its heart is a politics that owes little to popular democracy (except in the most superficial sense), but almost everything of substance to transnational corporations, financial interests, ruling elites, transnational institutions of financial governance and compliant nation states.
As Sivanandan puts it:
Globalisation in political essence is international government by multinational corporations aided by nation states. In treating globalisation as a wholly economic project, we tend to overlook its political underpinnings. And the nation state is the political agency through which corporations are able to effect regime-change and/or sustain friendly regimes, militarily or politically to get at a country's resources and markets. 7 Biometrics, ID cards, databases, data-mining, interception of communications and more all existed before 11 September 2001. What stood in the way of their widescale development, their 'universality', was a political will which was constrained by a fading adherence to liberal norms. Take for example, the EU-FBI Requirements allowing for the interception of telecommunications (phone calls, emails and faxes) which were adopted by the EU as far back as January 1995, to give law enforcement agencies access to all communications data. 8 Despite that agreement on paper, EU governments displayed a distinct lack of 'political will' about proceeding with the EU-FBI 'Requirements'. Then, in 1998, it was proposed to amend these Requirements to cover internet and satellite telecommunications as well; the EU report setting this out was thought at the time to be virtually the finalised version (in ENFOPOL 19/99, 15 March 1999). Yet, this report too continued to gather dust, almost five years after the original agreement. By October 1999, the EU Working Party on the issue noted that 'progress in this matter is being very slow'. 'In previous meetings [the working party had] discussed that it could be sensible to get some political support from upper instances in the Council for this matter to go forward.[emphasis added]' The main reason for the delay and the apparent lack of political support was held to be 'the negative press that this issue has received in the media'. Perhaps, opined the Working Party, to counter this, the Council should put out a press release of its own but 'several delegations . . .
[thought] this could provoke a chain reaction and further negative press in the media'. 9 In effect, the 'leaking' of the contents of ENFOPOL 98 and ENFOPOL 19 and a widely reported campaign by civil society NGOs in the national European and international media at that time scuppered these proposed surveillance 'requirements'. But, a few years later, in 2004, no such constraints stopped the bulldozing through of a much wider provision: the mandatory retention of all communications traffic data.
The trigger
The deadly attack on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, and its aftermath, changed the scenario in two important ways. First, 'war' was declared on terrorism, a war that for its continuation drew on a wider politics of fear, enhanced and sustained by what was conceived as the 'clash of civilisations' -which, in turn, fostered, exacerbated and intensified a latent anti-Muslim racism, engendered by states, endorsed by politicians, propagated by popular media and embraced by majority publics. For the West, and most notably the US, this new hydra-headed enemy filled the political ideological void left by the ending of the cold war as globalising, economically powerful and technologically sophisticated western nations defined themselves in opposition to it. 10 Second, the sweeping measures to control the threat, adopted in the US and the EU, and initially presented as necessary, temporary responses have now become permanent. What was perceived and presented as 'exceptional' and time-limited, became the norm. And as time has gone on, the 'exceptional' has come to define the norm, and not just in the area of potential threats to security, but across the board. In a very real sense, the official mindset has changed. Take, for example, an area that is completely remote from any link with national security -is indeed as far away from it as possible -child protection. Of course, children deemed at risk require all available protection but does this mean that all children should be logged, tracked and surveilled from birth into adulthood, to death? Yet, in the UK, all children, from birth, are being placed on a national database with their personal details, school record and behaviour, and parents and guardians' details too. 11 It is hard to see the rationale for this, except that, because it can now be done, it is being done.
The vectors
At this historical juncture of the 'war on terrorism' and accelerating, intensifying globalisation, the interests of governments and states (especially their internal security and law enforcement agencies) and of transnational corporations and financial institutions neatly coincided. 12 In another happy coincidence, the technological revolution was ready for the next stage of its development. The humble kilobyte computer that had allowed widespread access to wordprocessing and the creation of databases was taking on another meaning as the ability to gather, hold and analyse data exponentially reached a new critical mass. No longer limited by capacity, mega-computers could now hold megabytes, gigabytes, terabytes and zettabytes of data. Databases could store masses of detailed and accessible personal information linked to digital images, fingerprints and DNA. Moreover, databases could 'talk to each other', enabling data-mining -later to be enshrined in the EU as 'interoperability' and the 'principle of availability'. 13 But it's not only people's pasts, personal profiles, physical attributes and domiciles that are detailed. The use of CCTV cameras has mushroomed alongside the emerging satellite location and tracking of goods, vehicles and people. Now nanotechnology, potentially incorporated in even the most minor of commercial purchases, promises even more precise tracking. Jeremy Bentham's nineteenth-century panopticon -a prison designed so that all inmates could be continuously watched while the watcher remained unseen -may become an alarming twenty-first century reality.
All of these technological changes were nearing commercial viability at the turn of the twenty-first century -all the transnationals needed was a 'green light' to extend the new technologies entering everyday life in society at large to big state projects with mega-bucks and guaranteed markets: 11 September provided that green light. At a stroke, gone were notions of privacy and rights; if it was technologically possible, why should it not be introduced (as former UK prime minister Tony Blair argued)? So, in the autumn of 2001, the governments of the US and the EU looked to the agencies, both internal (police and security) and external (intelligence-gathering, targeting, apprehending or neutralising) for answers to this perceived new threat. Some of the responses were directly related to tackling terrorism but many others were not. However, many of the measures ostensibly concerned with terrorism extended well beyond the initial remit, and others had little or nothing to do with tackling it. 14 Nonetheless, law enforcement agencies turned to the multinationals to develop technologies to meet their 'needs', duly reporting back to governments on the costs and changes to the law required.
It was perhaps inevitable -given the attack on the Twin Towers -that the first lucrative market to open up for exploiting the new surveillance market was air travel. If those coming into the US and the EU could be checked and controlled, terrorists could be stopped from entering. But who were the terrorists, apart from the obvious suspects? In the perceived 'clash of civilisations' that underpinned and legitimated the war on terror, all migrants from the Third World were potential 'terrorists' and, if not 'terrorists', then organised gangsters or simply potential criminals. All the arguments for 'Fortress Europe', constructed since 1988, were back on the agenda. (One megalomaniac proposal, though, was a step too far, even for the EU. In 1997 the Austrian Council Presidency's draft Action Plan to combat illegal immigration included the notion that everyone in the world should be fingerprinted!)
The EU-funded European Biometrics Portal in its Biometrics in Europe: trend report 2007 could not have put the new direction better:
The development of Biometrics is an outcome of globalisation, which is not only technological, but also political and economic: the world is now a global place for commerce, migrations, trusted exchanges of all kind of information and values. This creates new opportunities as well as new risks, crises, frauds, illegal traffics or even terrorism.
The pathology
What all this means is that the EU and its member states are, today, set on a path which will, in just a few years time, turn this into the most surveilled, monitored region in the world. 15 It is not just about placing everyone under surveillance to catch and deter criminals (major and petty), it is also about sanctioning those whose behaviour is deemed to be unacceptable ('anti-social'). 16 Whereas the justification for such exceptional measures is usually the need to fight terrorism and organised crime, the scope of many proposals is extended to either a long list of 'serious crimes' or, more frequently, to crime in general -that is, any crime, however minor. So what is to stop the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) or the security and intelligence agencies (SECINT) from profiling the personal life of a lawyer who is defending a well-publicised terrorist or villain? Or checking on the research, emails, sources, habits and life-style of a journalist delving into a sensitive area? And using this intelligence to pre-empt a planned court defence or news story?
Here, it is important to make the distinction between the surveillance society and the policing state, though they may well overlap and there is great potential synergy between the two. The examples I have outlined above pertain more to the policing state, and its use of the armoury of information that technological development and an authoritarian political will have made available and accessible. By and large, the surveillance society most aptly applies to our everyday lives, work, shopping, eating out, banking, travelling; our interaction through commercial transactions with major, financial, commercial and corporate interests many times each week. Collectively these bodies gather masses of often unchecked, personal data which is stored and exchanged to determine whether to employ us, give us a loan or a credit rating. 17 Such data is passed around the EU and outside. 18 But, and this is where the synergy comes in, it is also made available to the state to make its profiling of an individual more complete. For example, before being fingerprinted to get a new passport (plus an obligatory ID card), people in the UK have to attend an 'enrolment centre' where they are first questioned to prove 'they are who they are' -this is based on up to 200 questions including data gathered from multinationals' databases, such as banks and credit card companies.
The 'policing state', on the other hand, refers to the powers exercised by state officials, particularly coercive powers to detain and question, under a plethora of new laws and administrative measures. For example, in the UK, fingerprints and DNA taken from anyone arrested but not charged or convicted can be held in perpetuity. 19 Under the implementation of the 'Prum Treaty', originally an initiative of seven member states to cooperate on information-sharing, to be rolled out across the EU, the exchange of fingerprints and DNA will be allowed throughout the EU. At present the UK, because of the sweeping nature of its laws, has the largest DNA database in the EU and the world. But the Prum implementation is leading to demands on other EU states to lower their currently quite strict standards for the taking and keeping of DNA. And measures ranging from the draconian to the frankly bizarre have been targeted specifically on Muslim communities across Europe. 20 Much energy too has gone into compiling 'terrorist' lists and targeting 'suspects' on a mass scale, based apparently for the most part on their religious orientation or migrant status. 21 And all this involves the gathering and exchanging of information and intelligence in EU-wide databases and increasing operational cooperation between law enforcement and security agencies.
Examples of where the 'surveillance society' complements and feeds into the 'policing state' include videos recorded by commercial CCTV that are passed to the police to investigate a crime. Or records of online flight reservations are collected and passed to law enforcement and security agencies to check against their 'watch' and 'flagging' lists. 'Watchlists' cover those to be denied the right to board a plane or to be detained for questioning/arrest prior to departure; flagging means that any recorded activity by them is passed to one or more agencies (people of 'interest'). Moreover, the mushrooming private security industry is largely peopled by ex-police and military personnel who not only bring their experience but their contacts too.
There is also an overlap in the technology used. Multinationals, law enforcement and security agencies and government officials from the EU and the US attend scores of working parties, seminars, conferences and briefings to develop new methods to meet new demands by the 'policing state'. For the corporations, government/state contracts are like gold-dust, partly because of the size of such contracts and partly the certainty of an ever-expanding market. The EU Visa Information System (VIS), for example, requires the fingerprinting of visa applicants at embassies around the world, adding personal data, securing, storing and transferring the data as well as systems for checking watchlists and criminal records. At the point of entry to the EU, it requires 'readers' at every exit and entry point for 'one-to-one' checks and 'one-to-many' against VIS and national databases. What starts as an EU (or US or EU-US) system is highly likely to determine global standards to be imposed everywhere.
The prognosis
In effect, what these accelerating developments point to is the transition to a new era that can best be characterised as one of democratic authoritarianism, where the rewriting of the rule of law, and the erosion of meaningful accountability on the part of the state to the people, have undermined the whole concept of democratic control, while retaining its historical trappings.
The process through which this is being accomplished is -appropriately for the EU -a tripartite one. First, there is the machinery through which this is being established, the machinery of the surveillance society and the policing state, which I have outlined above. But that move to democratic authoritarianism relies in large part for its acceptance among the majority populations on the promulgation and inculcation of a state racism that postulates, and targets with increasing rigour, an enemy within. And that, in turn, dictates that the promotion of multiculturalism as a major feature of a liberal democratic society, based on the positive values of diversity, distinctive cultural histories, tolerance and understanding of the contribution of different communities to the wider society, be not merely eroded but actively repudiated through state edict and state policy, supported by a supine mass media. In the EU's brave new world, an official monoculturalism now holds sway, from Germany's leitkultur, to France's laïcité, to Norway's likhet and Netherlands' verzuiling, as Fekete and Sivanandan have shown. 22 Monoculturalism is not new but previously it was advocated by nationalistic and racist groups. Now it is the new EU norm to be nurtured and funded in the name of 'integration'. This is not the 'integration' of equals, defined by Roy Jenkins, Labour home secretary in the 1960s, as 'equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'. Today integration is construed as the imposition of the language, culture, tradition and histories of majority populations on all those 'others', from a great diversity of nations, who live in Europe as citizens or resident third-country nationals. Their overt adherence to these strict cultural standards is what will mark them out as belonging, or not belonging, as 'us' or not 'us'.
That is the ideology/homogenising impulse that underlies the surveillance and targeting of Muslim communities and cultures by the state (security and police agencies) and the media, for whom it is easy copy. Every Muslim is, after all, a potential terrorist (or criminal) especially if he or she has 'radical' views on world politics. 23 So much for the first two elements of the surveillance society/policing statethe technological bureaucratic apparatus, enlivened by a state racism that shifts its focus according to political and economic imperatives. But what of the EU's great, overarching cornerstone, the supremacy of the democratic principle? What is happening to democracy is the third element in the EU's transition to a new era.
The UK government-sponsored thinktank Wilton Park made a fundamental and telling point when, after a seminar in 1996, it reached the following conclusion:
Democracy must not be confused with capitalism. The former is a political system while the latter is an economic system. Although many capitalist countries are democracies, capitalism can exist without democracy. 24 What does this mean, in an era of global capitalism, when the reach of transnational corporations is virtually without limit and their economic power may well be greater than that of many, except the wealthiest, nation states? Just as global capitalist corporations readily and more easily profit from states where there is little or no popular democracy, they will expect states (national and European) and political systems (national and European) to ensure that where there is 'democracy' it is compliant to capital's needs. In such a contest, between weak, open and imperfect democracy, whose operations are transmitted through mass media that are often the offspring of the transnationals, and the powerbrokers of globalisation, which is likely to have more force on its side? Alarmingly, there is developing in the EU today a trend to a convergence of parties in a political system which, under the veneer of democracy, is increasingly authoritarian. 25 One of its features is the shift from 'consent' to 'consensus'. Governing with the 'consent' of the people belongs to the old liberal-democratic era and implies a process, however imperfect, whereby people know what is on the agenda and can read, debate and intervene if they wish. Often people opted not to get involved, but they had a choice. 'Consensus', on the other hand, is constructed (manufactured) by the EU's political elite, pronounced from on high and duly reported by a compliant media. People can either acquiesce or dissent (which only rarely influences decisions).
The EU's ideology claims to be based on common values such as 'freedom' and 'democracy' that are set in stone. Yet the political complexion of the EU has changed over the past ten years. In 1999, the EU had fifteen member states, twelve 'social democratic' governments (on the centre-left) and three on the right. Now there are twenty-seven EU governments, twenty-one on the right or extreme-right and six on the centre-left or right (including the UK government). This represents a major shift to the right across the EU, a shift in the centre of gravity that also affects the policies and practices being put on the table and agreed in the Council of Ministers and its working parties. These are what are then fed down to the nations' populaces.
Moreover, EU 'common values' can change and have changed to match the prevailing political wind. The Council of the European Union (the twenty-seven governments) and the European Commission claim to have balanced 'freedom' and 'security' since 11 September 2001. Yet security wins out every time, so pandering to the wishlists of the security services and law enforcement agencies, and is rarely challenged by the ruling elites (and government circles) around the continent, or indeed by the plethora of multinational lobby groups and quasiacademic 'thinktanks' that cluster around the EU's Brussels heartland.
By arguing that we are seeing a move to a 'one-party' or monolithic political system, I do not mean there is literally a single political party in the EU. Rather that the lack of any meaningful difference across the EU between the major political parties in their approach to the forces and powers of global capitalism means that they are effectively 'one'. Elections, which legitimate the exercise of power by governments and the actions of their states, result in marginal change.
And by a 'one-party' political system I am not just referring to political parties. 26 Democracy cannot be conceived of as simply limited to the casting of votes in elections every four or five years; democracy means creating and maintaining a political culture. A culture of diversity, debate, dissent, tolerance, respect for other cultures, a sense of history and an underlying humanity which sustains democracy between elections and which can in that space engage in and influence what is decided and done by governments and states.
Of course, there is no inevitability that 'democracy' will engender a political culture that is progressive. 'Democracy' can lead to the extreme Right taking power, authoritarianism and even fascism (see 1920s' Italy and 1930s' Germany). It is 'freedom' and 'liberty' that define a progressive democracy, fundamental human values that transcend political systems. 27 But without a genuine, popular democracy, basic freedom and liberty are much more at risk. It is that erosion of democracy which will allow authoritarianism to proceed unchecked in our changing Europe. What 11 September did was to hasten and exacerbate a process that was already under way -to hothouse it, as it were. We are involved in the creation of a world, where the political and the economic are dialectically intertwined in a way that is far more sophisticated and subtle than Orwell's 1984. But the authoritarian project I have tried to describe is as yet in its infancy.
There are some valid comparisons that can be made with the 1920s and 1930s in Italy and Germany -those that choose to can see the growth of an authoritarian state in the EU, combined with the demise of a meaningful political culture, as some did back then. Another parallel with the 1920s and 1930s is that those of us engaged with the struggle at the European level find ourselves reminded that it is the Left/progressives who are defending liberal-democratic values of accountability, scrutiny, openness, liberty and freedom. A prerequisite of effective opposition is an understanding of the nature of the problem with which we are confronted. In turn this means connecting our different struggles, uniting the pockets of resistance into movements of resistance in Europe and outside. Only then will we stand any chance of halting the juggernaut.
